Pursuant to Tax Court Rule 50(f), orders shall not be treated as precedent, except as otherwise provided.

UNITED STATES TAX COURT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20217

JAMES COPPEDGE,)		ρ_{\bullet}
Petition	er)		1547
recitioner,)	Docket No.	18727-11 L
v .)		
)		
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REV	ENUE,)		
)		
Responder	nt.)		

ORDER

Pursuant to Rule 152(b), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, it is

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall transmit herewith to petitioner and to respondent a copy of the pages of the transcript of the trial of the above case before Special Trial Judge Lewis R. Carluzzo at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on March 14, 2012, containing his oral findings of fact and opinion rendered at the conclusion of trial.

In accordance with the oral findings of fact and opinion, decision will be entered for respondent.

(Signed) Lewis R. Carluzzo Special Trial Judge

Dated: Washington, D.C. March 27, 2012

1	Bench Opinion by Special Trial Judge Lewis R. Carluzzo
2	Coppedge v. Commissioner Docket No. 18727-11L
3	March 14, 2012
4	THE COURT: The Court has decided to render
5	oral findings of fact and opinion in this case, and
6	the following represents the Court's oral findings of
7	fact and opinion (bench opinion).
8	Unless otherwise indicated, section
9 .	references contained in this bench opinion are to the
10	Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, in effect
11	for the relevant period. Rule references are to the
12	Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
13	This section 6330(d) proceeding has been
14	assigned in accordance with section 7443A(b)(4) and
15	Rule 182. This bench opinion is made pursuant to the
16	authority granted by section 7459(b) and Rule 152.
17	Except as provided in Rule 152(c) this bench opinion
18	shall not be relied upon as precedent.
19	Kristina L. Rico appeared on behalf of
20	respondent. Petitioner lived in Delaware at the time
21	the petition was filed. He is self-represented in
2,2	this case and did not appear at trial.
23	On June 9, 2010, respondent received from
24	petitioner a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax
25	Return, that purports to be petitioner's 2008 Federal

1	income tax return (return). On the return petitioner
2	(1) reports \$315,649.88 as his "taxable income", (2)
3	reports no 2008 Federal income tax liability, and (3)
4	claims a refund for the amount shown as his taxable
5	income. In the middle of the first page of the return
6	are the words "Accepted for Value Returned for Value
7	Settlement and Discharged", twice appear by stamp.
8	Under one of the stamped versions of this language,
9	petitioner's signature appears as "authorized
10	representative". The return is signed by petitioner
11	in the designated area on page two. In the area
12	designated "Your Occupation" petitioner entered
13	"Authorized representative of James Coppedge".
14	The return obviously "contains information
15	that on its face indicates that the self-assessment is
16	substantially incorrect". Section 6702(a)(1)(A).
17	Furthermore, the stamps shown on the first page of the
18	return, and petitioner's attempt to have the amount
19	shown as taxable income refunded to him reflect
20	petitioner's "desire to delay or impede the
21	administration of Federal tax laws". Section
22	6702(a)(2)(B). Consequently, and in due course, the
23	submission of the return resulted in the assessment of
24	a \$5,000 section 6702(a) penalty (underlying
25	liability) against petitioner for 2008.

1	In a letter dated February 7, 2011,
2	petitioner was advised that respondent intended to
3	levy (proposed collection action) in order to collect
4	the underlying liability. That letter also advised
5	petitioner of his right to request an administrative
6	hearing in order to challenge the proposed collection
7	action, which he did.
8	Petitioner did not suggest a collection
9	alternative to the proposed collection action during
10	the administrative hearing. Instead he challenged the
11	existence of the underlying liability claiming that
12	the liability had been satisfied. His claim in that
13	regard, stated in convoluted if not nonsensical terms,
14	has no merit as it is clear that the underlying
15	liability has never been paid. <u>See</u> section 6311;
16	section 301.6311-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs.
17	In a Notice of Determination Concerning
18	Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330,
19	dated July 20, 2011 (notice), respondent determined
20	that the proposed collection action is appropriate.
21	The language appearing in the petition filed in
22	response to the notice is so syntactically obscure
23	that but for the fact that the language is contained
24	in a document submitted to the Court by an individual
25	who apparently believes himself not subject to Federal

1	tax laws, the Court would have serious reservations
2	about petitioner's competency to proceed as a
3	self-represented litigant in this proceeding. Be that
4	as it may, a fair reading of the petition, to the
5	extent that we can make any sense from its contents,
6	shows that petitioner challenges the determination
7	made in the notice only because he is challenging the
8	existence of the underlying liability, once again
9	claiming that the liability has been satisfied.
10	Our jurisdiction in this matter is
11	established in section 6330(d).
12	The issue before the Court is whether
13	petitioner is liable for the underlying liability, and
14	we consider, de novo, the extent to which he is. See
15	<u>Lunsford v. Commissioner</u> , 117 T.C. 183, 185 (2001);
16	Callahan v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 44, 49 (2008);
17	Blaga v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-170.
18	As previously noted, petitioner did not
19	propose a collection alternative to the collection
20	action at the administrative hearing, and he does not
21	do so here. Actually, because petitioner did not
22	request a collection alternative at the administrative
23	hearing, he is not entitled to do so here. <u>See</u>
24	Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107, 113 (2007).
25	All things considered, there is little for

us to do in this matter. Petitioner does not suggest 1 that the underlying liability was improperly assessed, 2 or that the return is not a frivolous return within the meaning of section 6702(a); instead, he claims the liability has been satisfied for reasons only 5 meaningful to him. To the extent that respondent's burden of proof is not considered moot when weighed 7 against petitioner's apparent concession of the point, we find that respondent's burden with respect to the imposition of the section 6702(a) penalty here in 10 dispute has been satisfied. See section 6703(a). 11 Furthermore, petitioner does not, and is not entitled 12 to claim entitlement to a collection alternative in 13 this proceeding, and nothing submitted by petitioner 14 disputes respondent's evidence showing that respondent 15 has otherwise satisfied the obliqations imposed upon 16 him by section 6330. 17 On the basis of the evidence introduced by 18 respondent, we find that the return is a frivolous 19 return within the meaning of section 6702(a) and that 20 petitioner is liable for the section 6702(a) penalty 21 here in dispute. We further find that the underlying 22 liability has not been satisfied, and that respondent 23 may proceed with collection as determined in the 24

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notice.

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To reflect the foregoing, decision will be
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       entered for respondent.
                 This concludes the Court's oral findings of
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       fact and opinion in this case.
                  (Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the bench opinion
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       in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)
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